Architecture’s Place in Art History: Art or Adjunct?

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In a community discussion of the look of Chicago led by a working group of three faculty and three visiting journalists from the University of Chicago’s Franke Institute for the Humanities, W.T.J. Mitchell observed that he and his fellow faculty tend to take the local built environment for granted, depending on newcomers to provoke them to notice its qualities. Invoking Walter Benjamin’s observation in his essay of 1936 “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Mitchell concluded that Benjamin remains correct in claiming that we receive architecture in a state of distraction.1 In this case, however, distraction was not working through architecture in the sense in which Benjamin imagined it working, to redemptive revolutionary effect. Here it was the contemplative reporters for Time, the New York Times, and the Chicago Tribune who had the most to say about how buildings engage problems of visual culture, while the faculty related to their own built environment in a mode of distraction unharnessed to empowering revelation.2

The frequency of situations in which architecture falls out of art historical focus makes it important for art historians to think about how buildings and constructed landscapes fit within the current practice of art history, both in terms of disciplinary traditions that continue to inform teaching and research and in terms of how the discipline is changing as it broadens its geographic and cultural scope to span the globe, its range of media to include camera- and computer-based works, and its artifactual range to extend beyond art history’s “finest.” The questions I wish to pose here are what accounts for architecture’s eccentricity within art history and whether study of the built environment might make a uniquely valuable contribution to art history’s examination of visual culture. This essay focuses on the implications of the singular status of buildings as three-dimensional objects that, unlike sculpture or paintings, constitute occupiable environments. I begin with the problems this characteristic poses for several persistent traditions of art history.

First, Mitchell’s remark that architecture does not lend itself to the contemplative attention on which art history has long been predicated. Benjamin’s explanation of that claim, often cited these days in architectural circles, was that “buildings are appropriated in a twofold manner: . . . by touch and by sight. . . . On the tactile side there is no counterpart to contemplation on the optical side. Tactile appropriation is accomplished not so much by attention as by habit. As regards architecture, habit determines to a large extent even optical reception.”3 The inescapable physical condition here is that a building is a three-dimensional object at habitable scale, such that it may and often does constitute our environment. Consequently, architecture can only be grasped—it is more a matter of proprioception and cognition than of literal fingering. The impossibility of ever seeing a building in a single synthetic view renders it resistant to art history’s traditional techniques of visual analysis. Skills of spatial imagination are needed to collate a variety of disparate visual experiences, as well as technical drawings of aspects invisible to a visitor to the building, in order to understand a building synthetically. If this is true for a single beholder of a building, how can we effectively teach inexperienced students to accomplish such a thing solely through pictures in a classroom? This difficulty points to ways in which architecture is at odds with the pictorial orientation of art history.

In reflecting on the relationship between pictorial and three-dimensional works, I have turned for insight to the somewhat more manageable situation of sculpture (insofar as sculpture does not presuppose habitable scale), consulting a recent collection of essays on the ways photography translates sculpture into pictorial terms.4 In an essay on André Malraux, Henri Zerner considers this proposition of the former French minister of culture: “For the last hundred years art history . . . has been the history of that which can be photographed.”5 Zerner observes that ever since Heinrich Wölfflin’s formative patterning of art historical discourse around pairs of contrasted pictures in the early twentieth century, photography has been the primary means of converting objects into terms for which a common set of similarities and differences can be adduced, permitting a discussion of style and aesthetic impact. He continues: “In other words, sculpture needs mediation; it profits particularly from photography, not because this medium is more faithful to sculpture but, on the contrary, because photography acts more forcefully upon objects that demand to have a point of view imposed on them” (123). Thus, photography converts the old-fashioned (because three-dimensional) art of sculpture into the two-dimensional realm of painting and pictures, which Malraux termed “our art”—that is, the modern art of his twentieth century. Zerner rightly recognizes the tension within Malraux’s stance, and by extension, within art history’s traditions, between the insistence on the ontological presence of the unique object and the need not only to preserve and circulate it but even to view it through pictures. It is useful in this light to recall that Wölfflin began his art historical career by attempting to fit architecture into a framework of psychological aesthetics, and later maintained that the comparative categories he formalized in 1914 in his Principles of Art History worked so well for architecture that architecture constituted “the most express embodiment” of the Baroque ideal of the “painterly.”6 How intriguing that the tamer of three-dimensional objects began with architecture only to develop a pictorial basis for visual analysis that effectively reinforced the eccentricity of buildings within art history. And that the common ground Benjamin found some sixty years ago between architecture and film, ancient and novel media, has not replaced the divisive effects of Wölfflin’s pictorial method on the subject matter of art history.
The relationship of buildings to pictures is of course not limited to the situation of relying on pictures as a substitute for, or even a supplement to, the inaccessible object.8 Studying a building on the spot through the disparate views it affords of its exterior and interior arguably magnifies the discomfort it causes by the habitable object. How is it that so familiar an object as a building can induce greater anxiety than a painting among art historians and their students? Is it merely a question of the demands that buildings make on the spatial imagination when we substitute attentiveness for our habitual (that is, distracted) mode of interaction with them? The current popularity of anxiety as a psychosocial explanation for a vast range of phenomena has provoked a reexamination of the psychological aesthetics that shaped the early professional practice of art history, as in the case of Wöllflin, a century ago. Necessarily, that reexamination has been affected by the intervening development of psychoanalysis, particularly British work on object relations.9 The way anxiety has been used to explain the challenge posed by sculptural objects to art historical tradition also has rhetorical implications for architecture’s place in art history. For example, in an essay on photography and Minimalist sculpture, Alex Potts quotes the sculptor Carl Andre as follows: “There’s something essentially infantile about the sculptural relation to matter. It has to do with the infant differentiating itself from the world... It’s a disaster when one realizes one is discontinuous [from the world]. There is the self, and all that is not the self.” Potts expands on that idea: “The uneasy inadequacy of the photographs of Andre’s work registers something of this tension between an unframed tactile closeness to the object and an irreducible separation and otherness.” Briony Fer similarly links an anxiety induced by “the kinds of demands [sculpture] makes on the spectator because of the sheer phenomenal presence of the object” to Freud’s theorization of anxiety as “a response to the threat or danger of a loss that might be incurred by the subject, stirring memories of traumatic experiences of loss and separation, such as birth, weaning, and the threat of castration.” 10 If this argument holds for sculpture, it is still more appropriate to buildings, because of their phenomenal qualities as objects and because they are also inhabited environments, variously benevolent extensions of the self and alienating obstacles to its desires.

Let us momentarily defer the implications of characterizing buildings in terms of psychologically archaic experience to consider a related problem: the utilitarian aspect of architecture in terms of art history’s traditions.

I am certainly not alone among architectural historians in having reexperienced, through graduate students and colleagues unaccustomed to analyzing architecture, the shock of trying to bear in mind simultaneously the seemingly contrary notions of a building as utilitarian and as purposive-without-purpose in the Kantian sense of a disinterested work of art. I recall walking into class to find a chair installed below a drawing of a chair on the blackboard, with a student next to them demanding to reconsider how that thing and such a sign of the thing could be said to cohabit in the chair itself. She was acting on her astonishment that Umberto Eco would extend simultaneous status to a building as a habitable object and as a sign of itself in the same sense that a painting of a building might be called a sign of a building.11 Yet have modern art historians objected to the limiting case of a self-referential painting whose aesthetic purpose is to draw attention to itself as an instance of pigment deposited on stretched canvas? Surely in this instance the actual painting is not only a painting but also a sign for actual painting.

Similarly provocative was the open discussion that followed a debate between architects Peter Eisenman and Stanley Tigerman sponsored by Critical Inquiry in 1993, where the audience consisted of nonarchitectural faculty members of considerable critical sophistication accustomed to thinking about Surrealism, Dadaism, Situationism, and other instances of oppositional artistic practice in diverse media. Given that October, as a major journal for examining and encouraging oppositional artistic practice, was launched under the umbrella of the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies, which Eisenman had co-founded and directed in New York, Eisenman may have anticipated sympathy for an avant-garde artistic stance from the Critical Inquiry milieu as well.12 But to his declaration that he wanted to challenge the bourgeois expectations of comfort among those encountering his buildings, the audience responded uncomprehendingly: Yes—but why haven’t you put benches out in front of them where we might sit and talk? Don’t substitute an allegory of dislocation for usable goods, or else make the full argument for why we should let you construct such inhospitable buildings!

Neither impasse was caused by naiveté; no one was taken aback by the abstract proposition that an object has both aesthetic and practical valences. The problem lies in the difficulty of putting that abstraction to work in assessing buildings, whether for ordinary or scholarly purposes. Perhaps nonarchitects and nonarchitectural historians expect continuity between the ordinary habitual experience of a building and its aesthetic purposiveness. But that is not the heart of the problem, because Eisenman’s intent presumably was not to refuse such a link but rather to create an aesthetic experience that could condition habit—along Benjamin’s lines. Nor does the usual answer to this problem—to factor in the contingent conditions for making buildings in comparison with the relatively free production of paintings—take us very far. Moreover, mere continuity between utility and formal purposiveness (such as creating an aesthetic logic that emphasizes the building’s utilitarian purpose) would not satisfy art historical skepticism about Eco’s argument on the coexistence of function and signification or meaning. For my purposes, Eco’s advocacy of a semiotic approach is not important in itself; what matters here is the vital issue he engages, however unsuccessfully, of how to think with some consistency within and across the many different domains addressed by a building.13 Finally, we are still left with the historical problem of how a utilitarian production came to count as a fine art and the practical problem of how to accommodate it in art history. We might well want to substitute, explicitly, another philosophical framework for art history that does not segregate purpose and formal purposiveness. Is that not implicit in some of the work carried out under the rubrics of material culture (whether in the context of American studies or ancient archaeology) and of visual culture?14 And does it not then demand from a bright graduate student the question of what to do with the persistent traditions of art historical practice?
Architecture’s eccentricity within art history is due not only to its utility and to the difficulty of visualizing its three-dimensional form and habitable scale but also to its literal materiality, which some scholars, as noted above, associate with infantile experience. Ostensibly descriptive, that characterization reinforces the hierarchy of artistic media that Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics made so compelling to modern imaginations informed by the Enlightenment.\(^{15}\) For Hegel, architecture was not so much eccentric to art history as superseded by progressively more expressive media in a development that ultimately transcends the visual arts altogether. In his narrative of aesthetic history as the liberation of sensuously engaged mind from material constraint, expressiveness correlates with the degree of immateriality afforded by each artistic medium; consequently, materiality is the basis for architecture’s glory as the first art and the irreducible constraint that causes its decline. Yet the most persistent and fascinating effect of Hegel’s narrative is not the archaism or primitivism reinvoked in the twentieth century by Benjamin or by Sigfried Giedion, his contemporary in architectural criticism and history, but rather the predicament in which it places architecture as at once more concrete and more abstract than the other visual arts. If, in the Hegelian scheme, artistic media are to be ranked by their capacity to evoke experience by illusionistic means, architecture figures as alpha and omega: it has the obdurate aspect of matter yet bypasses the intermediate arts of explicit representation to share in the sheer rhythmic capacities of poetry and music, freed of specific reference to actual contingent experience in the world.\(^{16}\) This is presumably the logic by which Wolfflin later rescued architecture from the Hegelian hierarchy and erected it as a parallel to painting and sculpture—by subjecting architecture to a pictorially defined aesthetic while also invoking the abstract aspect of architecture’s aesthetic character. The complexity of the predicament stems from the presumption shared by Hegel and Wolfflin that visual art depictively refers to experience in the material world. Architecture does not fit easily within this premise because a painting’s or sculpture’s material refers to something other than its paint or marble substance, whereas architecture’s material does not usually depict extrinsic subject matter even though its arrangement has aesthetic and utilitarian effects.\(^{17}\)

Perhaps Wolfflin’s salvaging of architecture was only possible in the late nineteenth-century ambience of psychological aesthetics, an ambience that ultimately fostered the invention of abstraction as a substitute for representation in painting and created a new basis for parallelism among modern media at the Bauhaus. Giedion consequently updated the art historical method of his teacher Wolfflin according to the new premise of abstract reference to experience, in which illusions of space rather than of events or things became the common currency across art history.\(^{18}\) That Giedion’s historical sequence of “space conceptions” never proved very compelling to painting historians relates partly to its neglect of what is inconvenient or irrelevant in architecture: the subject matter of representational art.

The problem of how to accommodate architecture in a graduate program of art history by measures beyond merely hiring an architectural historian remains obvious in some recent nomenclature and in that strangely nominalist yet essence-defining exercise of our discipline, surveys of art history, through which up-and-coming specialists learn how to situate their medium when teaching broadly in the classroom. Historically, architecture has been included, but only nominally; practically, it is generally excluded or isolated as a disjointed topic. In an art history department generating new research and training new historians, isolation depletes the intellectual vitality of architectural history. Three instances of nomenclature: first, as Sylvia Lavin and Tom Gunning have pointed out for architecture and film respectively, the appeal of the synthetic project to study “visual culture” across media has the drawback of emphasizing vision at the expense (nominally, at least) of the ways these media also appeal to other senses.\(^{19}\) The case could be made that all media merit consideration in terms of aesthetic experience through the other senses; curators and dealers should not be alone in handling paintings as objects. Second, the former Department of Fine Arts at Harvard, of which over a third of the faculty specialized in architecture when I was a graduate student and which assumed that architecture was a fine art, recently became the Department of the History of Art and Architecture, suggesting that the category of art, though capacious, does not include architecture, even if these separate entities are appropriately joined in one department. Moreover, the university’s course-labeling system implies that every course will combine the two categories, generating such nonsensical titles as “History of Art and Architecture 105: 19th-Century Printmaking.” Finally, Marilyn Stokstad, in a recent survey construing the title Art History as encompassing a broad array of media, also opts to add architecture onto art. Take contributor Bradford Collins’s comment distinguishing architects from painters and sculptors not only in agenda but also in professional name in his section on early twentieth-century art in the West: “Although architects, like scientists of the time, tended to agree in principle on what constituted the mainstream, modernist artists often disagreed, which is why painting and sculpture of this era are so diverse.”\(^{20}\)

Seeking current editions of new and old surveys still in wide circulation, I sampled two cultural moments for their treatment of architecture in relation to painting: the Renaissance, especially in early sixteenth-century Rome, whose artists offer the opportunity for a synthetic discussion of media, and early twentieth-century western Europe, where the Bauhaus among other enterprises explicitly sought to reconceptualize the arts and industry in interrelated ways.\(^{21}\) Ernst Gombrich, whose title promises a seamless Story of Art, begins each chapter with at least one architectural illustration, which sets the scene for an unrelated discussion of paintings and the occasional sculpture. He never explains how Amsterdam’s former Town Hall functions as a “mirror of nature,” though it introduces a chapter so titled. For the sixteenth century as a whole he provides seven illustrations for architecture, seven for sculpture, and fifty-three for painting. In launching the century with Bramante’s Tempietto, he observes that the soaring aesthetic ambition of artists is most obvious among architects because they now had to find the rare client who would sponsor facades prioritizing aesthetic notions of classical regularity and harmony over unruly functional considerations. Yet even in those circumstances, buildings are quickly passed over.\(^{22}\) Such is the price of constructing a story
of art on a pictorial theory of art and illusion. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Stokstad pays the price for an inclusive history of art, fragmenting the story among specialities. The architecture sections, like their counterparts, provide a precise specialized vocabulary in which abundant architectural terms are boldfaced, a task that overwhelsms other purposes. Although this survey explains that sixteenth-century architects developed “ideals” parallel to those of painters and sculptors, the opportunity for treatment according to that common agenda is bypassed. Between these two texts is an often-used alternative to H. W. Janson’s survey: The Visual Arts: A History, by John Fleming and Hugh Honour. While buildings are integrated into discussion of painting and sculpture in High Renaissance Rome, more traditional architecture yields disjunction, as in the section on northern Europe, where an agentless summary of architectural styles is followed by the subheading “Hieronymous Bosch,” announcing authored painting. Neither section of the book seriously engages the autonomous vocabulary or problems of architecture, as does Stokstad’s book, although the authors generally presume architectural autonomy. In the case of early twentieth-century modernist architecture from Europe, mainly addressed in separate sections, the authors feel as obliged as Gombrich to plead the case that these buildings are formally purposive, not merely functional, though their abstracted appearance might make them seem an architecture stripped down to “functional” necessity.

Art historians find it hard to draw architecture into work on pictorial media partly because architectural and pictorial history have periodically swapped emphases, creating a disalignment of agendas at any given moment that makes it difficult for outsiders to dip into the literature of architectural history. At the period when the sister arts of painting and poetry emphasized internal form, architecture embraced inspiration from industrial production and society, producing the need for the historian to insist on architecture’s less-than-obvious aesthetic intent in the surveys cited above. Later, as painting historians turned to social history, architectural historians rediscovered form. At Harvard, for instance, Sydney Freedberg’s final courses in the first half of the 1980s on Renaissance painting based on the formal connoisseurship of his Pelican survey, drew avid architecture students who were then being reconnected to art history in the comparably formalist terms of Giedion’s Space, Time and Architecture in courses at Harvard’s Graduate School of Design. Ironically, just as the architecture school was lifting Walter Gropius’s ban on the teaching of history to students, with the effect of encouraging a fresh interest in architecture’s form and formal history, T. J. Clark arrived in Freedberg’s art history department to teach the social interpretation of modern painting that he would soon publish in The Painting of Modern Life. While architecture students released into the history of art tended to seek formal similarities between works of art from vastly different sociocultural moments, social historians of art sought to link works to highly specific historical circumstances. Another example: while a parallel has valuably been drawn between the midcentury formalism of critics Clement Greenberg in painting and Colin Rowe in architecture, the timing of their respective influences on the histories of painting and architecture differs, as does the import of their formalism. Greenberg culminated a history of modernist emphasis on the materiality of a painting as a two-dimensional surface, with the ultimate effect of sustaining its illusionism (through illusions of space where an agenda of abstraction precludes representational subject matter). Rowe focused on the pictorial aspect of facades only to elaborate modern architecture’s well-established effort to dematerialize its structure by placing its aesthetic emphasis on virtual spatial effects. The overall point to be drawn from Greenberg versus Rowe is architecture’s continuing struggle to meet the Hegelian aesthetic imperative to dematerialize, even while critics were emphasizing painting’s materiality—another instance of swapped agendas complicating the common historical ground. To make matters more complex, in contemporary architecture the mutation of Rowe’s virtual effects of fluctuating depth into new kinds of virtual space has led the critic Robert E. Somol to observe that the most innovative architecture is now simultaneously autonomous (that is, concerned with formal problems internal to the medium) and political (critically engaged with the institutions that permit its existence). That is a qualified autonomy to bedevil future surveys.

It is a commonplace that architecture, freighted with materiality and utility and dependent on capital-intensive commissions from watchful clients, lags in absorbing ideas pioneered in more free-spirited arts. However important architecture’s contingency, it is more interesting and probably more productive to put aside that hierarchy of influence in favor of considering the histories and practices of different artistic media synchronically in terms of what they accomplish for each art and the interrelationships and disjunctures they imply. As a practicing architectural historian, I would not abandon those aspects that make architecture a unique medium but I refuse to choose between “form” and “social function.” The best site for examining architecture in terms of its own professional practices and discourses, especially recent ones, is probably the doctoral programs based in architecture schools, where the fellowship of architectural practitioners and researchers supports that emphasis. What architectural history can best do from its base in art history departments in liberal arts colleges and universities, especially those without architecture schools, is to explore architecture’s historical relationships to other artifacts and artistic media and probe their sociocultural meanings. This requires bringing down the barriers to look at architecture’s status from the outside as well as the inside of that specialty. What art historians currently share with departments across the university is a fascination with the interpretative potential of studying the objects, spaces, landscapes, and geographies that mediate human transactions and are shaped by them, a common ground David Van Zanten and I revisited with panelists in history, literature, anthropology, and architecture in the session “Architectural History and Its Companions” at the 1998 meeting of the Society of Architectural Historians. Architectural historians working in art history departments with few specialist colleagues ignore this bond at their peril; they risk becoming superfluous. Yet architectural historians share with other art historians skills of visual analysis that are rarely deployed by colleagues from other disciplines. It is past time to make common cause by studying phenomena that
link architecture to other visual media and by demonstrating the aesthetic stakes in a sociocultural analysis of buildings that considers both their significance as spaces of social performance and their necessarily formal materiality as buildings. In so doing, art historians may find that architecture poses some of the most intellectually demanding questions for aesthetic and social history, and the field may begin to attract some of the brightest young minds to the challenge of an art history that understands pictures as but one kind of material object.

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Notes
2. “Hyde Park and Environ: Visual Impressions,” a discussion with the members of the Journalists and Scholars Project, Franke Institute for the Humanities, University of Chicago, May 10, 1999. W.J.T. Mitchell was embraced as an art historian by the College Art Association when it awarded the Moepr Prize to his Picture Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
3. Benjamin (as in n. 1), 240.
7. For the history of how photographic pictures came to be taken as substitutes for objects, see Joel Snyder, Nineteenth-Century Photography of Scenery and the Rhetoric of Substitution,” 21–34, on photographs as supplements to the object, see David Green and Joanna Lowry, “Splitting the Index: Time, Object, and Photography in the Work of Joseph Beuys and Yves Klein,” 148–65, both in Johnson (as in n. 4).
11. Umberto Eco, “Function and Sign: The Semiotics of Architecture” (1973), reprinted in Signs, Symbols and Architecture, ed. Geoffrey Broadbent, Richard Bum, and Charles Jencks (Chichester, Eng.: Wiley, 1980), 11–69. Following Roland Barthes’s Elements of Semiology, Eco asks “whether it is possible to interpret function as having . . . to do with communication and therefore whether it is possible to interpret architectural objects, which “are not designed to communicate . . . but to function” (12), as “systems of signs” (11), which communicate by definition. He decides that a building both permits or fosters a given function and “communicates the function to [be] fulfilled.” In other words, he continues, “the spoon promotes a certain way of eating and signifies that way of eating, just as the cage promotes the act of shelter and signifies the existence of the possible function; and both objects signify even when they are not being used” (13–14). Again reprinted in The City and the Sign, ed. Mark Gotttiener and Alexandros Lagopoulos (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), and in Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory, ed. Neil Leach (London: Routledge, 1997), this essay has entered the canon of contemporary architectural theory.
12. The title page of early issues reads “October is published . . . by the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies,” although with the disclaimer that it “does not reflect the views of the I.A.U.S.” I.A.U.S. operated in Manhattan from 1967 to 1984 as a self-confessed federation of avant-garde architects working in and encouraging research, design, and education.
13. Certainly there were historical reasons for architectural writers to embrace semiotics in the 1970s and 1980s, such as the desire to loosen the mid-20th-century dogma that each building should be a novel “solution” to unique “problems” of use and structure, in favor of encouraging explicit references to forms and concerns beyond the self-contained conditions of an isolated building—the direction associated with Robert Venturi and Charles Jencks and termed postmodernism in architectural circles at the time. Here my interest is not in the movement served by semiotics (in fact, Eco’s essay attempts to undermine architectural historicism) but in the way Eco’s attempt to match his semiotics to the medium of architecture (and membership in the architecture profession) generated a historically persistent problem of thinking about the multifaceted character of buildings as at once usable and aesthetic. See below, however, regarding the historical question of how a mid-20th-century episode of self-referentiality in architecture was out of phase with the comparable self-referential movement in painting.
14. See “Material Culture Studies: A Symposium,” Material Culture 17, no. 213 (1985), especially the contributions by Jules Prown and Dell Upton, who advocate, from their respective departments of art history and architecture, approaches encompassing both purposive and utilitarian artifacts, and October 77 (summer 1996), a tendentious issue organized as a forum on visual culture.
17. This is a version of the problem addressed in Eco’s essay and treated by Denis Hollier, Against Architecture (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), chap. 3. The postmodernist tradition of conceiving of architecture as modeled on the human body or nature nonetheless posits a fairly abstract relationship between buildings and their sources of inspiration, relative to representation or sculpture.
21. Given my focus on the relationship among two- and three-dimensional media, I am solely concerned here with broad surveys accommodating at the minimum painting, sculpture, and architecture. Significant conceptual change in the presentation of art history to students and general readers in introductory texts is more likely to appear first in survey volumes of far narrower scope, such as the several series of volumes currently in production on specific periods of Western art. Those often treat architecture in separate volumes. For the latter, see, for example, Ashley Anderson, Writing the Architectural Survey,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 58 (Sept. 1999): 350–55.
23. Stokstad (as in n. 20), vol. 2, 683.
24. For example, John Fleming and Hugh Honour, The Visual Arts (1982; 4th ed., New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1995), 771–72, on Le Corbusier; and Gombrich (as in n. 22), 560–61, on Bauhaus “buildings and fittings.” As for the leading studies, Helen Gardner’s Art through the Ages (1926) and H. W. Janson’s History of Art (1962), which continue to be updated in new editions, both find formal language to indicate a few aesthetic continuities between architecture and other media at particular periods, but that continuity depends on citing a limited range of works.